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Casenote

Debate on State Versus Federal
Regulation of Insurance Continues
American GeneralInsurance Co. v. FTC,
359 F. Supp. 887 (S.D. Tex. 1973)
For over a century there has been a continuing controversy
concerning state versus federal regulation of insurance. Since the
passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act' (hereinafter the "McCarran Act"), the primary responsibility for regulation has been with
the states.2 However, the decision in American General Insurance
Co. v. FTC3 once again raises the issue of federal regulation of
certain areas of the insurance trade. In American General, the
court held that the language of the McCarran Act limiting the
application of thte Clayton Act4 to those situations where the bus-

iness of insurance is not regulated by state law did not deprive
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") of jurisdiction to challenge
a merger between two insurance companies. There were two
grounds for this holding. First, the court concluded that state regulation would be impossible because of the extraterritorial impact
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1958) [hereinafter cited as McCarran Act]:
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged
therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which im-poses a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That
after June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended,
known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914,
as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission
Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by
State law.
2. This is the policy of Congress as set forth at 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1958):
Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is
in the public interest, and that silence on the part of Congress
shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation
or taxation of such business by the several States.
3. 359 F. Supp. 887 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 18 et seq. (1970).
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of such a merger.5 Further, the court noted that under the McCarran Act, states are exempted from federal statutes only if they
regulate the "business of insurance."6 The court concluded that
the "business of insurance,"
since merger activity was not part of
7
it was not subject to state regulation.
The case involved a merger agreement between American General Insurance Company, an insurance holding company with its
principal place of business in Houston, Texas, and Fidelity and
Deposit Company of Maryland, an insurance company with its
principal place of business in Baltimore, Maryland. The FTC filed
a complaint alleging that the effect of the merger would be substantially to lessen competition or to create a monopoly in violation
of section 7 of the Clayton Act.8 After a determination by the
full commission that the FTC was not preempted by the McCarran
Act from challenging the merger,9 the insurance companies filed
suit in district court seeking an injunction to halt further action
by the FTC. The court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies,' 0 but in so doing considered the
merits of the case.
5. 359 F. Supp. at 895.
6. Id. at 896.
7. Id. at 897.

8. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970):
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or
other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole
or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also
in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section
of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
9. The administrative law judge of the FTC had held that there was
adequate state regulation of the merger and granted the insurance
companies' motion for summary decision and dismissal of the complaint. The decision was appealed to the full commission and the
determination of the administrative law judge was vacated.
10. The plaintiff insurance companies contended that the commission's
denial of their motion for summary decision was a final ruling under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1964). The FTC
responded that the denial of the motion for summary decision was
only an interlocutory order and not a "final ruling." Further, the
FTC argued that in any event, the proper forum for review of proceedings initiated under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970),
was the court of appeals. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention
and held that it had no jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act to review the commission's action because the denial of the
motion for summary decision was neither an action made reviewable
by statute nor a final agency action for which there was no adequate
remedy in a court.

INSURANCE
This casenote will be limited to a discussion of the court's holding that the McCarran Act did not deprive the FTC of jurisdiction
to challenge insurance company mergers as violations of the Clayton Act.
The problem faced by the court in American General had its
beginnings in 1868 when the United States Supreme Court held
in Paul v. Virginia that a state statute requiring insurance companies to be licensed before they could carry on business within
the state was constitutional. The court reasoned that the issuance
of an insurance policy was not a transaction of commerce and insurance contracts were not articles of commerce.' 2 During the
more than 75 years that this view prevailed, the states became dominant in the field of insurance regulation.
In 1944 the Supreme Court held in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association'3 that the business of insurance constituted interstate commerce and that the Sherman Act was applicable to interstate insurance transactions.14 The period immediately following the South-Eastern decision was one of uncertainty
for both the insurance companies and the states. The states feared
that taxes imposed on insurance contracts written within their borders might be considered an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce.' 5 Because of the uncertainty surrounding the ability
of the states to tax, the insurance companies were refusing to pay
their taxes or paying them under protest. 16 Many believed that
the scheme of state regulation which had emerged between the

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Plaintiffs, relying on Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), further
argued that administrative remedies need not be exhausted in situations where an agency clearly is exceeding its jurisdiction. The court
rejected plaintiffs' argument and concluded that Kyne provided an
exception to the exhaustion rule only in those situations where the
assertion of jurisdiction by the agency is in "flagrant disregard of
their statutory authority. .. ." 359 F. Supp. at 892, or where plaintiffs lack an adequate remedy at law. See K. DAvis, ADusTRATS
LAw TEt= §§ 20.01, 20.02, 20.03, 20.05 (3d ed. 1972), where the author
indicates that the area of exhaustion is unsettled and that the only
"rule" in the area is that "sometimes exhaustion is required and
sometimes not." Id. § 20.02 at 384 (emphasis original). Davis suggests that the proper way to decide questions of exhaustion would
be to examine (1) the extent of possible injury, (2) the doubt or
clarity about administrative jurisdiction and (3) the possibility of
specialized administrative understanding. Id. § 20.10 at 194.
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
Id. at 183.
322 U.S. 533 (1944).
Id. at 560.
91 CONG. Rac. 1087 (1945) (remarks of Representative Hancock).
Id.

292

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 53, NO. 2 (1974)

Paul decision and the South-Eastern decision had been severely
17
shaken.
The Congressional response to this uncertainty was the passage
of the McCarran Act. In order to encourage the "continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance,"' 8 the following provisions were enacted:
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate
to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair,
or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or
tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance; Provided,That after [a moratorium period],
the ... Sherman Act, and.., the Clayton Act, and... the Federal Trade Commission Act . . . , shall be applicable to the busi-

ness of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated
by State law. 19

Thus, in the absence of specific federal legislation, the states were
free to regulate and tax the business of insurance except that certain federal legislation (including the Clayton Act) would, after
a moratorium period, 20 be "applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by
'2

State law."

1

17. Donovan, Regulation of Insurance Under the McCarran Act, 15 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 473, 476 (1950).

18. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1958).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1958).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (1958) provides in part:
(a) Until June 30, 1948, the ...
Sherman Act, ...
the
Clayton Act, . . . the Federal Trade Commission Act, and

the Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, shall not apply to the business of insurance or to acts in the conduct
thereof.
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said
Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.
This provision was included to exempt the states, for a period of approximately 3 years, from the provisions of the named legislation.
This was necessary to give the states time to enact, if they so desired,
legislation which might otherwise conflict with the suspended laws.
It should be noted that § 1013(b) ensures the continued application
of the Sherman Act to agreements to or acts of boycott, coercion or
intimidation. See 91 CONG. REc. 1443 (1945) (remarks of Senators
McCarran and Ferguson).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1958) (emphasis added). This entire scheme
of regulation was challenged in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin,
328 U.S. 408 (1946) as being inconsistent with the commerce clause,

INSURANCE
I.
The resolution of the issue of what constitutes state "regulation"
sufficient to preempt federal action provided the first basis for
the holding in American General. 22 The plaintiffs urged that the
regulation of merger activity was the province of the states and
that only in those instances where there was no attempt to pass
regulatory legislation would the FTC have jurisdiction to challenge

mergers. 23 Plaintiffs argued that the merger between American
General and Fidelity and Deposit was regulated in two respects:
first, by the antitrust laws of the principal places of business of
the merging companies 24 and second, by the licensing requirements

of each of the states where the resulting company would be en-

gaged in business. 25 The court rejected the argument that the

22.

23.
24.

25.

but was upheld by the Court. See B. SCHwAIUz, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw § 71 (1972).
What must be done to constitute "regulation" is not precisely clear.
In the Senate debate on the McCarran Act, the following exchange
took place:
Mr. MURDOCK: ... Does the Senator take the position that
the states could absolutely repeal all their insurance laws
and still be regulating insurance?
Mr. PEPPER: Well, if they repeal the laws and had no regulation, of course, that would not be regulation.
91 CONG. REc. 1481 (1945) (remarks of Senators Murdock and Pepper). Thus, at a minimum, states must legislate. The Supreme Court
in FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958), assumed that "there
is some difference .. .between 'legislation' and 'regulation,' .... 1"
Id. at 565. The Court concluded that the petitioner in that case had
not argued that the statutory provisions involved were a "mere pretense" and therefore could not question the effectiveness of the statutes. More recently, the sixth circuit in Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance
Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971), refused to look at the quality of state regulation. It had been alleged that state rating regulations were not effective. The court found no support for the contention that there should be an inquiry into the effectiveness of the state's
enforcement of its regulations. The Supreme Court denied certiorari,
409 U.S. 917 (1972), with Justice Douglas arguing in dissent that the
question of whether or not the regulation was a "mere pretense"
should be decided. This sequence of events has led one author to
conclude that the courts will not make "a qualitative evaluation regarding a state's regulating activities even if it is alleged that the
regulatory activity is a pretense .... " Sfikas, The Quality of State
Regulation Necessary to Invoke the Insurance Exemption to the Antitrust Laws, 1973 INs. L.J. 305, 310.
359 F. Supp. at 893.
Id. at 894. The merger between the two companies was approved
by the insurance authorities of both Maryland and Texas, but the
court made no reference to the specific statutes under which the
merger was approved.
Id.
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states had regulated the merger concluding that a state has no
ability to regulate beyond its borders, and, because of this disability, could be expected to take a parochial view of a proposed merger.26 In the words of the court, a state would not "examine a
merger in terms of [its] national effect.12 7 The implication of the
court's reasoning appears
to be that state regulation of merger ac28
tivity is not possible.

The court's conclusion that a state is unable to regulate merger
activity is premised on the inability of states to regulate extraterritorially. 20 To support its contention, the court in American
General placed primary reliance on FTC v. Travelers Health Association.30 In that case an insurance company organized in Nebraska and licensed to do business only in Nebraska and Virginia
sold insurance policies through the mails in all states. The FTC
charged the company with employing deceptive advertising practices in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act.3 1 A Nebraska statute prohibited deceptive trade practices in Nebraska or
in any other state.3 2 The court of appeals determined that this
state statute was sufficient "regulation" to preclude federal legisla26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Note, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1088, 1097 (1962).
29. The statements of Senator O'Mahoney illustrate the Congressional intent on this point:
[T]here is not a line or sentence in the proposed act, as I
have read it, which would delegate to any State the power
to legislate in the field of interstate and foreign commerce.
State regulation must be for the State and not for the United
States.
and
Nothing in the proposed law would authorize a State to try
to regulate for other States, or authorize any private group
or association to regulate in the field of interstate commerce.
91 CONG. REC. 1483 (1945) (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney). See also
FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293, 300 (1960); Ohio AFLCIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178, 1184 (6th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 242 F. Supp. 56, 72 (N.D.
Ill. 1965).
30. 362 U.S. 293 (1960), rev'g 262 F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1959), -emanded,
298 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1962).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
32.
No person shall engage in this state in unfair methods of competition or in unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of the business of insurance. No person domiciled in
or a resident of this state shall engage in unfair methods of
competition or in unfair or deceptive acts and practices in
the conduct of the business of insurance in any other state,
territory, possession, province, country, or district.
Ch. 191, § 2 [1957J Neb. Laws 666-67.

INSURANCE

tive control under the McCarran Act.3 3 The Supreme Court reversed and held that "the state regulation which Congress provided
should operate to displace [the Federal Trade Commission Act]
the State in which the deception is practiced
means regulation by
s4
and has its impact

On remand, the eighth circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's
holding to mean that the state in which the deception was practiced and had its impact would have to "regulate" the practice
through legislation "capable of being enforced through the exercise of its own powers." 3 Because 48 of the 50 states would have
to rely on the statutes, instrumentalities and processes of Nebraska in order to exercise legal compulsion, the court held that the
activities involved were not "regulated by State law" within the
meaning of the McCarran Act.3 6
33. 262 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1959).
34. 362 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1960) (emphasis added). The Court stated the
same definition another way when it concluded that Congress, when
it used the term "regulated," meant "only regulation by the State
where the business activities have their operative force." Id. at 30102.
35. 298 F.2d 820, 823 (1962).
36. Id. at 824-25. The concept of state enforcement of its own legislative
provisions through the exercise of its own judicial powers as established by the Supreme Court and the eighth circuit in Travelers
Health is essential in determining whether a state "regulates" in situations where two or more states are affected by an activity. There
are two conditions precedent to "regulation": first, a state must have
legislation, and second, it must be able to enforce this legislation
through its own powers. Assuming that a state has a regulatory
scheme, the next question is whether it can enforce the regulation.
This is not a question of jurisdiction, which under modern statutes
would be obtainable in most situations. The ultimate issue is that
of post-judgment enforcement, and was illustrated by the eighth circuit:
[I]n forty-eight of the states, Travelers Health Association
is without any license, agency relationships, commercial accounts, or other direct presence of person or property, upon
which the state can auxiliarly lay hands in enforcement compulsion. If its orders, decrees and judgments are to be enforceable, the state must seek the aid of the statutes, instrumentalities and processes of another state.
Id. at 824-25. A case presenting this problem in the context of the
regulation of merger activity is United States v. Chicago Title & Trust
Co., 242 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill. 1965). There Illinois and Missouri
were the domiciliary states of two insurance companies seeking to
merge. The court found that Missouri's statutes did not "cover Chicago Title's absentee acts, nor could they be enforced against Chicago
Title," id. at 71-72 (emphasis added), and that Illinois' antitrust statutes were not applicable to the business of insurance. In short, Illinois had no legislation and Missouri had legislation but no means
of enforcing it.
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The court in American General concluded that "the extraterritoriality rationale of Travlers applies with equal force to federal
antitrust regulation under the Clayton Act.'"3 7 However, the application of the Travelers Health rationale to merger activity is
questionable for two reasons. First, the rule in that case was applied to the easy factual situation. There, the test of whether there
was "regulation" was whether the state in which the activity was
practiced
and had its impact could regulate the particular activity.38 Due to the nature of the activity involved in Travelers
Health (mail order advertising which was alleged to be deceptive),
it was "practiced" and had its "impact" in a single state-the state
where the advertising was received. This was not the case in
American General. The activity to be regulated (merger) is theoretically "practiced" in the two domiciliary states (Maryland and
Texas), but its impact also occured in 48 other states. Since the
"practice" and "impact" are split between two or more states, the
considerations governing whether there has been "regulation" will
be different from the situation where the regulated activity is practiced and has its impact in the same state.3 9
Moreover, the applicability of the Travelers Health rationale to
the facts of American General is questionable because unlike the
situation in Travelers Health, the company formed as a result of the
merger was licensed to do business in all 50 states.40 Therefore,
if the effect of the merger spread across state lines, the states affected would have the power to enforce through judicial compulsion their own regulatory legislation concerned with the effect of
merger activity. The plaintiffs in American General argued that
this was one form of state regulation. 41 The problem with this
type of regulation is that it comes after the fact. The activity
to be regulated is the merger, and it would have taken place before
states which grant the resulting company a license to do business
pass judgment. Therefore, effective regulation is most likely to
occur only in those states that have initial control over a proposed
merger. These are the only states which could refuse to allow the
companies to merge. A refusal by the domiciliary states to ap37. 359 F. Supp. at 895.
38. 362 U.S. at 298-99.
39. The problems presented by the multi-state impact of a merger might
be eliminated by analyzing the situation in terms of the relevant area
affected. It might be argued that due to the extensive regulation
of the business of insurance by the individual states, the affected area
extends only to the borders of the state. The impact would then
occur within a single state by definition.
40. 359 F. Supp. at 894.

41. Id.

INSURANCE
prove a merger application would appear to meet the requirements
of Travelers Health since the regulation could be enforced through
the exercise of the states' own powers, and the activity ispracticed
and has an impact in those states. However, the impact is also
felt in other states, and the question which ultimately must be
answered is whether regulation by the states initially approving
the merger is adequate regulation insofar as other affected states
are concerned.
Traditionally, the purposes of insurance regulation have been
largely parochial in nature, 42 and it appears that the regulation
of merger activity is not an exception.43 However, if the domiciliary states feel that competition would be lessened and deny
the application to protect their own citizens, the citizens of other
states would be indirect beneficiaries. Such a theory of regulation would force the citizens of one state to rely on the regulations
of another state for protection-a result4 4which the Supreme Court
found objectionable in Travelers Health.
42. See Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary
Inquiry into the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MARN. L. REv. 471
1961). Kimball, while recognizing that the relationships of insurance
companies with the outside world will have some effect on their regulation, sees the primary role of insurance regulation as that of insuring the successful operation of the company itself. The premise underlying this theory is that the policyholder will be protected so long
as the "solidity" of the company is protected.
43. A limited perspective with respect to merger activity is evidenced
by § 3 (d) (1) of the Model Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory Act which provides for the approval of a merger unless, inter
alia, "the effect of the merger or other acquisition of control would
be to substantially lessen competition in insurance in this State or
tend to create a monopoly therein. . . ." Proceedings, 1969 NAT'L
Ass'N or INs. COwvu'Rs 738, 744 (vol. 2). This factor was noted by
the court in American General. 359 F. Supp. at 894 n.5.
44. 362 U.S. at 296-97, 298-99. This point was made explicitly by Judge
Vogel who dissented in the circuit court opinion. 262 F.2d at 245.
In considering the case on remand, the eighth circuit found enforcement relying on comity between states insufficient "regulation" under
the McCarran Act. The court explained that it had contemplated a
situation in which states having regulatory legislation would cooperate with states which were affected by an activity but had no means
of judicial compulsion:
[I]f Travelers Health Association sent improper soliciting
material into a state where it was not licensed, the insurance
department of such state would bring the matter to the attention of the Nebraska Director and he would take appropriate steps to deal with the situation in accordance with his
official responsibility.
298 F.2d at 822. The court went on to note that the Supreme Court
"made it clear that this ... [did] not constitute the type of control
to which the McCarran-Ferguson Act requires the Federal Trade
Commission Act to yield." Id.
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The analytical problems in applying the rationale of Travelers
Health to merger activity are compounded by an inconsistency between the way states choose to regulate the business of insurance
in practice, and the theoretical premise implicit in applying Clayton Act concepts to the business of insurance. The chief regulatory
approach taken by the states is to treat insurance as a "regulated
industry" subject to rate regulation 5 and a system of contract approval. 46 The assumption underlying this type of state regulation
and the assumptions underlying the Clayton Act are in apparent
conflict. On one hand, the states recognize that the business of
insurance is primarily non-competitive and therefore subject it to
regulation, the purpose being to force the insurance industry to
operate as if it were competitive. 47 On the other hand, the implication in applying the Clayton Act to the business of insurance is
that the insurance industry is no different than any other industry
and must operate in a manner consistent with the ideal of a free
and open market place.
The relevant inquiry under the McCarran Act is whether or
not a particular activity is "regulated" by state law. The "regulated industry" approach to insurance regulation does not regulate
competition in the same way as the Clayton Act does, but arguably, the same purposes are ultimately achieved. Recent decisions
indicate that courts are hesitant to pierce the veil of state regulatory schemes in order to question the quality or effectiveness of
the regulation.4" At least one court, however, has rejected the
"regulated industry" approach as an alternative to the application
of Clayton Act concepts.4 9 If this traditional type of state regula45. See Kimball & Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-FergusonAct in Historical Perspective, 56 McH.
L. REv. 545 (1958); STATE OF NEW YORK INSURANCE DEPARTMENT,
TAE PUBLIC INTEREST Now IN PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE REGULATION pt. IV (1969).

46. Kimball & Pfennigstorf, Legislative and Judicial Control of the Terms
of Insurance Contracts: A Comparative Study of American and European Practice,39 IND. L.J. 675 (1964).
47. See Nankin Hosp. v. Mchigan Hosp. Serv., 361 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
Mich. 1973); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 361 F. Supp. 774 (W.D.
Pa. 1972) (Blue Cross was not monopolistic because "it not only lacks
control over the rate-making effects normally incident to lawful com"
Id.
petition, but is without power to establish its own rates ..
at 780).
48. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
49. In United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 242 F. Supp. 56 (N.D.
Ill. 1965), the acquisition of the stock of a Missouri insurance company by an Illinois insurance company was challenged as a violation
of section 7 of the Clayton Act. It was argued that Missouri had
a "public utility" approach to rate regulation and therefore achieved

INSURANCE
tion is rejected as inadequate, the inquiry in the area of state regulation of merger activity will most likely focus on the extaterritorial problems of regulation which occur when Clayton Act concepts are applied. 50 This could lead to a re-evaluation of state
regulatory schemes and possibly bring about a major change in
the theory of state regulation of the business of insurance. 5'
II.
The second basis for the court's decision in American General
was that merger activity was not the "business of insurance" as
contemplated by the McCarran Act.52 In construing the term
"business of insurance," the court relied solely on SEC v. National
Securities, Inc.,5 3 which involved a proposed merger between two
insurance companies. The SEC alleged violations of the Securities
Exchange Act 54 and sought a dissolution of the merger because
of certain omissions and misrepresentations made to the stockholders of one of the companies when the merger was submitted for
their approval. The district court denied relief5 5 and the ninth
the same objective as would have been the case under the antitrust
statutes. The court rejected this approach saying:
The instant case is one where the states have not [acted comparably to Section 7] even though in one respect their "public
utility approach" may accomplish the same end as antitrust
regulation. The Federal Government has decided competition is healthy economics and that intent is not necessarily
satisfied because one of its ends is achieved by another
means.
Id. at 71. Contra, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 361 F. Supp.
774 (W.D. Pa. 1972), affd, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
42 U.S.L.W. 3352 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1973)

("Congress ..

. recognized the

fact that the salutary effects of competition may be accomplished by
regulation as well." Id. at 781).
50. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra. One author has suggested an approach where the regulation of the competitive aspects
of the business of insurance is left to the federal government as a
possible solution. McHugh, The Real Issue: State Versus Federal or
Regulation Versus Competition? in INsURANcE, GOVERNMENT, AND
SociAL PoLIcY 193, 203 (S. Kimball & L Denenberg eds. 1969)

[hereinafter cited as McHugh].
51. See McHugh, supra note 50. McHugh suggests that in the area of
rate regulation of automobile insurance, open competition subject to
the antitrust laws (accomplished through an amendment to the McCarran Act) would provide an alternative to rate regulation by state
rating bureaus. See also STATE OF NEw YoRK INsURANcE DEPARTvENT, THE PUBLIc INTEREST Now

ANCE REGULATiON pt. IV, at

52.
53.
54.
55.

mn PRoPERT

132-50 (1969).

359 F. Supp. at 896.
393 U.S. 453 (1969).
15 U.S.C. § 77 (1970).
252 F. Supp. 623 (D. Ariz. 1966).

AND LmBnaTY INsUR-
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circuit affirmed on the basis that the action was barred by the
McCarran Act. 56 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
Act did not preclude federal regulation of the relationship between
the insurance company and its stockholders because '57such regultion was not a regulation of the "business of insurance:
[W]hatever the exact scope of the statutory term, it is clear where
the focus [of the McCarran Act] was-it was on the relationship
between the insurance company and the policyholder. Statutes
or inaimed at protecting or regulating this relationship, directly
directly, are laws regulating the "business of insurance."58
In American General the court concluded that the merger did
not touch the company-policyholder relationship and therefore was
not part of the "business of insurance":
The relationship involved in the merger of insurance companies

is in essence one between individual companies and between those
companies seeking to merge and the industry as a whole. State
56. 387 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1967).
57. 393 U.S. at 460. The Court went on to discuss the fact that the state
of Arizona had approved the merger which the FTC sought to unwind. The Court viewed the approved merger as a secondary issue
since the primary focus of the complaint was the misrepresentations
made to the stockholders. It had been contended that any attempt
to interfere with a merger approved by state insurance officials would
be a violation of the McCarran Act. The Court, however, found it
could not accept "this overly broad restriction on federal power." Id.
at 463. For recent discussions of state regulation of mergers, see Fry
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D. Tex.
1973) (relying on National Securities, the court stated that "any state
statutes purporting to regulate antitrust aspects of insurance company
lending ... would be antitrust regulation rather than insurance regulation." Id. at 1153) and Commander Leasing Co. v. Transamerica
Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1973) (interpreting National Securities as saying mergers are not a "part and parcel of the 'business
of insurance.'" Id. at 85).
58. 393 U.S. at 460. This emphasis on the relationship between the insurance company and the policyholder is uniform throughout those
cases interpreting the term "business of insurance." See Fry v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1155 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (a
tie-in arrangement whereby those requesting farm loans were required to purchase irrigation systems and/or life insurance policies
as a condition of obtaining the loan was not part of the "business
of insurance"); De Voto v. Pacific Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 354 F. Supp.
874 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (competing for a list of customers was not part
of the "business of insurance"); Hill v. Nat'l Auto Glass Co., 293 F.
Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (securing for particular glass dealers the
business of an insurance company was not part of the "business of
insurance"). Cf. Nankin Hosp. v. Michigan Hosp. Serv., 361 F. Supp.
1199 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (providing prepaid hospital care is part of
the "business of insurance"); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481
F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1973) (Blue Cross' relationship with hospitals is
part of the "insurance business").

INSURANCE
anti-trust statutes seek to deal with the competitive aspects of
these mergers, certainly a subject far removed from the relationship between the insurance company and the policyholder contemplated in National Securities as constituting the "business of insurance". . . .59
In characterizing the relationship in this manner, the court may
have forced the conclusion without adequately evaluating the relationships involved. National Securities is authority only for the
proposition that the "business of insurance" is concerned primarily
with the relationship between the insurance company and the policyholder. Under the facts of that case, the relationship involved
was clearly one between the insurance company its stockholders.
On the other hand, the relationship to be protected by the regulation of merger activity can be characterized in at least two ways.
First, the relationship could be characterized as one between
the merging companies and between the industry and the merging
companies as the court did in American General. This would be
the result if the emphasis is placed on guarding against the evils
of "bigness" and protecting the free entry of smaller companies
into the market place. Second, the relationship might be characterized as one between the insurance company and the policyholder-a result the court rejected in American General. One of the
purposes of regulating mergers is the protection of the consumer,
which in the case of the insurance industry includes the policyholder. It is the policyholder who in the final analysis would be
the victim of a lessening of competition. This characterization assumes that the insurance industry is competitive in the first place,
for if the business of insurance is operated as a regulated industry,
the consumer-policyholder may be adequately protected regardless
of the anti-competitive effects of mergers. This illustrates once
Clayton Act concepts
more the possibility of inconsistencies 6when
0
are applied to the business of insurance.
In summary, the court in American General may have been
too hasty in concluding that the relationship involved in the merger was not one between the insurance company and the policyholder. By choosing to characterize the relationship as it did, the
court in effect predetermined the result without considering other
possible concerns of the Clayton Act.
CONCLUSION
Merger activity has become increasingly prevalent in the insurance industry. In the face of continuing acquisitions through
59. 359 F. Supp. at 896-97.
60. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
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mergers and holding company schemes, the question of state versus
federal regulation becomes very important. By applying traditional McCarran Act principles to the regulation of insurance company
mergers, the court in American General overlooked possible conflicts between the theory and practice of insurance regulation.
Further elaboration will be necessary before the conflict between
federal and state regulation of merger activity is finally resolved.
Richard C. Reier '75

